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ABSTRACT
This paper builds a multi-country, multi-sector general equilibrium model that explains the decision
of heterogeneous firms to serve foreign markets either through exports or local subsidiary sales
(FDI).  These modes of market access involve different relative costs, some of which are sunk while
others vary with sales volume (such as transport costs and tariffs).  Relative to investment in a
subsidiary, exporting involves lower sunk costs but higher per-unit costs.  In equilibrium, only the
more productive firms choose to serve the foreign markets and the most productive among this
group will further choose to serve the overseas market via FDI.  The paper then explores several
implications of the individual firms’ decisions for aggregate export and FDI sales relative to the
domestic and foreign market sizes.  In particular, it is shown that firm level heterogeneity is an
important determinant of relative export and FDI flows.
We use the model to derive testable empirical predictions on the relative aggregate export and FDI
sales in a given country for a given sector based both on relative costs and the extent of firm level
heterogeneity in that sector.  These predictions are tested on data of US affiliate sales and US
exports in 38 different countries and 52 sectors.  The comparative statics based on relative costs are
very similar to those tested by Brainard (AER 1997) and are confirmed in our data: sector/country
specific transport costs and tariffs have a strong negative effect on export sales relative to FDI.
More importantly, our new predictions for the effects of firm-level heterogeneity on the relative
export and FDI sales are also strongly supported by the data: more heterogeneity leads to
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     1 Introduction
Multinational sales have grown tremendously in the last two decades. Growth of these
sales has even outpaced the remarkable expansion of trade in manufactures. Conse-
quently, the trade literature has sought to incorporate the mode of foreign market
access into the “new” trade theory. This literature recognizes that ﬁrms can service
foreign buyers through a variety of channels: they can export their products to for-
eign customers, serve them through foreign subsidiaries by engaging in foreign direct
investment (FDI), and license or contract with foreign ﬁrms to produce and sell their
products.
Our work focuses on the ﬁrm’s choice between exports and “horizontal” FDI.1
Horizontal FDI refers to investments in production facilities abroad that are designed to
serve foreign customers. We therefore exclude “vertical” motives for FDI, that involve
fragmentation of production across countries.2 We follow the previous literature on
horizontal FDI in assuming that foreign aﬃliate production is intended for the host
country market.3 However, we show in an appendix how our model can be extended
to incorporate exports by foreign aﬃliates. This adds a new motive for FDI: the use of
aﬃliates as “export platforms.” In all these cases, however, ﬁrms invest abroad when
the gains from avoiding transport costs outweigh the costs of maintaining capacity in
multiple markets. This is known as the proximity—concentration tradeoﬀ.
We extend the proximity—concentration tradeoﬀ literature by introducing intra-
industry ﬁrm heterogeneity. We build a simple multicountry, multisector general equi-
librium model that explains the decisions of heterogeneous ﬁrms to serve foreign mar-
kets through exports or local subsidiary sales. These modes of market access have
diﬀerent relative costs, some of which are sunk (such as entry costs) while others vary
1See Ethier (1986), Horstmann and Markusen (1987), and Ethier and Markusen (1996) for models
that incorporate the licensing alternative.
2An example of vertical FDI is when a parent ﬁrm invests in a production facility in another
country in order to produce inputs that will be shipped back to the parent for further processing. Or
when a parent ﬁrm produces only inputs in the home country and it invests in an assembly facility
in another country to which it ships these inputs. See Helpman (1984), Helpman (1985), Markusen
(2002, Ch. 9), and Hanson, Mataloni and Slaughter (2002) for treatments of this form of FDI.
3See, for example, Horstmann and Markusen (1992), Brainard (1993), and Markusen and Venables
(2000).
1with sales (such as transport costs and tariﬀs). Relative to FDI, exporting involves
lower sunk costs but higher per-unit costs.4
We show that ﬁrm heterogeneity in productivity plays an important role in explain-
ing the structure of international commerce. First, only the most productive ﬁrms
engage in foreign activities. This result mirrors other ﬁndings on ﬁrm heterogeneity
a n dt r a d e ,i np a r t i c u l a r ,t h er e s u l t sr e p o r t e di nM e l i t z( 2 0 0 2 ) . 5 Second, of those ﬁrms
that serve foreign markets, only the most productive engage in FDI.6 Third, the extent
of intra-industry ﬁrm heterogeneity plays a key role in determining the volume of FDI
sales relative to the volume of exports. Hence, we identify a new industry character-
istic – the dispersion of productivity levels across ﬁrms – as a determinant of the
composition of trade.
This allows us to derive new insights from the proximity—concentration tradeoﬀ.
First, standard proximity—concentration variables determine the productivity levels
that a ﬁrm must achieve to make its international activities attractive. But these
productivity levels do not fully determine the composition of trade; they have to be
combined with information about the degree of dispersion of productivity levels across
ﬁrms within every industry in order to forecast trade ﬂows.7 Second, our model avoids
the knife-edge conditions associated with existing general equilibrium models of FDI
that are based on representative ﬁrms. In a typical model from this family, exogenous
4Sunk costs associated with exporting allow the model to explain two important empirical patterns:
the existence of substantial subsets of ﬁrms within every manufacturing sector that do not engage in
any form of international commerce, and the existence of large numbers of foreign wholesale aﬃliates
whose main activity is to redistribute the output manufactured by the parent ﬁrm. Although such
ﬁrms are technically multinationals, the foreign aﬃliates do not duplicate the production process. In
the context of our model, we characterize such ﬁrms as exporters who incur ﬁxed distribution costs in
the destination country. In our empirical work, we exclude the sales of these wholesale aﬃliates from
our measure of FDI sales.
5See also Bernard, Eaton, Jenson and Kortum (2000) for an alternative theoretical model and
Tybout (2002) for a survey of the empirical literature.
6This result is loosely connected to the documented empirical pattern that foreign-owned aﬃliates
are more productive than domestically-owned producers. See Doms and Jensen (1998) for the U.S.
and Girma, Thompson and Wright (2002) for the U.K.
7Our model formalizes the old idea that multinational ﬁr m sm u s th a v es o m ef o r mo fo w n e r s h i p
advantage conferred by access to ﬁrm-speciﬁc intangible assets (for a discussion of this literature,
see Markusen (1995)). In our model this intangible asset takes the form of a superior production
technology. Our analysis takes this idea further, by allowing industry characteristics – such as
transport costs – to govern the extent of an ownership advantage needed to induce a ﬁrm to become
multinational and by positing a distribution of these assets within an industry.
2industry characteristics mandate that either all ﬁrms invest abroad or that none does.8
In contrast, in our model ﬁrm heterogeneity plays a central role in pinning down the
number of ﬁr m st h a te x p o r ta n dt h en u m b e ro fﬁrms that invest abroad. This provides
a more appealing and realistic explanation for the concomitant use of exports and FDI
sales. Finally, our model identiﬁe san e w“ h o m em a r k e tb i a s , ”w h e r e b yt h en u m b e r
of ﬁrms that locate their headquarters in a particular country rises disproportionately
with the country’s size; while small markets are disproportionately served by aﬃliates
of multinational companies and by exporters from other countries.
We test the predictions of the model on U.S. exports and aﬃliate sales data that
cover 52 manufacturing industries and 38 countries. We show that the productivity
dispersion measures help to predict the composition of trade and investment in the
manner suggested by the model. Industries in which productivity levels vary highly
across ﬁrms are characterized by a larger volume of FDI sales relative to exports. We
show that these results are robust across several measures of productivity dispersion. In
addition, we conﬁrm the predictions of the proximity—concentration tradeoﬀ.W eﬁnd
that ﬁrms tend to substitute FDI sales for exports when transport costs are relatively
high and when plant-level returns to scale are relatively weak. We conclude that intra-
industry ﬁrm heterogeneity plays an important role in determining the composition of
international trade.
The remainder of this paper is composed of three sections. In section 2 we elaborate
the model and characterize its equilibrium. We then map the theoretical results onto
an empirical strategy for testing our main hypotheses concerning the role played by
ﬁrm heterogeneity in the proximity—concentration tradeoﬀ between exports and FDI
sales. In section 3 we describe the data. Finally, we report and interpret the empirical
results in section 4.
8Only on the “knife-edge” can ﬁr m st h a te x p o r ta n dﬁrms that do FDI coexist.
32 Theoretical Framework
There are N countries that use labor to produce goods in H +1sectors. One sector
produces a homogeneous product while H sectors produce diﬀerentiated products. A
fraction βh of income is spent on diﬀerentiated products of sector h and a fraction
1 −
P
h βh on the homogeneous good, which is our numeraire.
Country i is endowed with Li units of labor. We take
P
h βh to be small enough
and diﬀerences in Li to be small enough so that the homogeneous product is produced
in every country and wages are equalized across countries.9 The homogeneous product
is produced with one unit of labor per unit output. As a result, the common wage rate
equals one.
Now consider a particular sector h that produces diﬀerentiated products. For the
time being we drop the index h, letting it be understood that all sectoral variables
refer to sector h.
To enter the industry in country i, a ﬁrm bears the ﬁxed costs of entry fE,m e a s u r e d
in labor units. An entrant then draws a labor-per-unit-output coeﬃcient a from a
distribution G(a). Upon observing this draw, a ﬁrm may decide to exit and not
produce. If it chooses to produce, however, it bears additional ﬁxed overhead labor
costs fD. There are no other ﬁxed costs when the ﬁrm sells only in the home country. If
the ﬁrm chooses to export, it bears additional ﬁxed costs fX per foreign market. On the
other hand, if it chooses to serve a foreign market via foreign direct investment (FDI),
it bears additional ﬁxed costs fI in every foreign market. We think about fX as the
costs of forming a distribution and servicing network in a foreign country (similar costs
for the home market are included in fD). The ﬁxed costs fI include these distribution
and servicing network costs, as well as the costs of forming a subsidiary in a foreign
country and the duplicate overheadp r o d u c t i o nc o s t se m b o d i e di nfD. The diﬀerence
between fI and fX thus indexes plant-level returns to scale for the sector.10 Goods that
are exported from country i to country j are subjected to melting-iceberg transport
9We will show later the precise restrictions on the cross-country variation in Li that are needed for
this outcome. Our empirical work will not rely on this assumption.
10Part of the cost diﬀerence fI − fX may also reﬂect some of the entry costs represented by fE,
such as the initial cost of building another production facility.
4costs τij > 1.N a m e l y ,τij units have to be shipped from country i to country j for one
unit to arrive. After entry, producers engage in monopolistic competition.
Preferences across varieties of product h have the standard CES form, with an
elasticity of substitution ε =1 /(1 − α) > 1.11 These preferences generate a demand
function Aip−ε in country i for every brand of the product, where the demand level Ai is
exogenous from the point of view of the individual supplier.12 In this case, the brand of
a monopolistic producer with labor coeﬃcient a is oﬀered for sale at the price p = a/α,
where 1/α represents the markup factor. As a result, the eﬀective consumer price is
a/α for domestically produced goods – be they supplied by a domestic producer or a
foreign aﬃliate (with the labor coeﬃcient a)–a n di sτjia/α for imported products
from country j (from exporters with the labor coeﬃcient a). Imported products are
thus more expensive than domestically produced goods due to transport costs.
A ﬁrm from country i that remains in the industry will always serve its domestic
market through domestic production. It may also serve any foreign market j.I fs o ,i t
also chooses a channel to access this foreign market: exports via domestic production
or local sales via aﬃliate production (FDI). This choice is driven by the proximity—
concentration tradeoﬀ: relative to exports, FDI saves transport costs, but duplicates
production facilities and therefore requires higher ﬁxed costs.13 In equilibrium, no ﬁrm




















where z is consumption of the homogenous good, xh (v) is consumption of variety v from sector h,
and Vh is the set of all potential varieties in sector h.







where Ei is the aggregate level of spending in country i, ni is the number (measure) of varieties
available in country i and pi (v) is the consumer price of variety v.
13We exclude the possibility of exports by foreign aﬃliates. See, however, the appendix for a
discussion of this possibility.




ij¢ε−1 fX >f D. (1)
We shall clarify the role of these conditions in the following analysis.






for a ﬁrm with a labor—output coeﬃcient a,w h e r eBi =( 1− α)Ai/α1−ε.15 On the














j − fI .
These proﬁt functions are depicted in ﬁgure 1 for the case in which the demand levels
are the same in countries i and j.16 In this ﬁgure, a1−ε is represented on the horizontal
axis. Since ε>1, this variable increases monotonically with labor productivity 1/a,
and can be used as a productivity index. All three proﬁt functions are increasing linear
functions of this index. More productive ﬁrms are therefore more proﬁtable in all three
activities.
14In a dynamic model with uncertainty, an individual ﬁrm may choose to serve a foreign market
through both exports and FDI. Rob and Vettas (2001) provide a rigorous treatment of this case.
15Note that the demand function Aip−ε implies output Ai (a/α)
−ε when the price is a/α. Under
these circumstances costs are αAi (a/α)
1−ε while revenue is Ai (a/α)
1−ε. Therefore operating proﬁts
are
πi
D =( 1− α)Ai (a/α)
1−ε − fD.
16We thank Dani Tsiddon for proposing this ﬁgure. In the ﬁgure fX >f D,w h i c hi sas u ﬃcient
condition for the second inequality in (1). Evidently, this inequality can also be satisﬁed when fX <
fD, and we need only the inequality in (1) in order to ensure that some ﬁrms serve only the domestic
market.
6The slope of πi
D equals Bi w h i l et h es l o p eo fπ
j
I equals Bj.T h e s ep r o ﬁt functions
are parallel to each other when the demand levels are the same in countries i and j.
Proﬁts from FDI are lower, however, because the ﬁxed costs of FDI, fI,a r eh i g h e rt h a n
the ﬁxed costs of domestic production, fD.T h es l o p eo fπ
ij
X equals (τij)
1−ε Bj,w h i c hi s
smaller than the slope of π
j
I. Together with the ﬁrst inequality in (1), these relationships
i m p l yt h a te x p o r t sa r em o r ep r o ﬁtable than FDI for low-productivity ﬁrms and less
proﬁtable for high-productivity ﬁrms. Moreover, there exist productivity levels at













,w h i c he n s u r e st h a ts o m eﬁrms export to country j.









that some ﬁrms serve only the domestic market.
The least productive ﬁr m se x p e c tn e g a t i v eo p e r a t i n gp r o ﬁts and therefore exit the
industry. This fate befalls all ﬁrms with productivity levels below (ai
D)
1−ε,w h i c h
is the cutoﬀ at which operating proﬁts from domestic sales equal zero. Firms with








have positive operating proﬁts from
sales in the domestic market, but expect to lose money from exports and FDI. They







is the productivity level at which exporters just break even. Higher


















export while those with higher productivity levels build subsidiaries in
country j, which they use as platforms for servicing country j’s market. It is evident






































j = fI − fX for all j 6= i. (4)
Free entry ensures equality between the expected operating proﬁts of a potential













































































the demand levels Bi in every country. Evidently, these solutions do not depend on the
country size variables Li, as long as the variation in country size is not large enough
to induce some countries to specialize in diﬀerentiated products. Moreover, it is easy
to see that we can also allow cross-country variations in the ﬁxed cost coeﬃcients, as
long as these variations do not lead some countries to stop producing the outside good.
These generalizations are useful for our empirical application.
2.1 Solving the Full General Equilibrium Model: A Special Case
In order to build the intuition behind our model and its empirical predictions, we ﬁrst
examine a special case that exploits some symmetry across countries. Assume, for
this purpose, that all ﬁxed cost coeﬃcients are the same in every country, that the
distribution function G(·) is the same in every country, and that transport costs per
product are the same for every pair of countries. The latter assumption means that
τij = τ>1 for every j 6= i. These restrictions are within every sector, so that there

































Using this expression and the deﬁnition of the function V (a) in (6), we obtain the free entry condition
(5). Note that the expected operating proﬁts can be smaller than the entry costs in some sectors,
in which case no domestic ﬁrm would enter that industry. This is possible in a trading/investment
equilibrium where consumers satisfy their consumption demand with foreign goods that are produced
by either foreign exporters or by local subsidiaries of multinational corporations.
8can be variations in these characteristics across sectors. Moreover, countries can diﬀer
in size.
Under these circumstances, the equilibrium system (2)-(5) implies the same cutoﬀs
ai
D = aD, a
ij
X = aX, a
ij




D B = fD , (7)
(τaX)






I B = fI − fX , (9)




V (aI)B + τ
1−ε(N − 1)V (aX)B
− [G(aD)fD +( N − 1)G(aI)(fI − fX)+( N − 1)G(aX)fX]=fE. (10)
Figure 2 describes the distribution of labor productivity that is induced by G(a).
It also describes the equilibrium cutoﬀs. The ﬁg u r ei st h es a m ef o re v e r yc o u n t r y .T h e
fraction of surviving ﬁrms is given by the area below the curve to the right of 1/aD.
The area between 1/aD and 1/aX represents the fraction of entrants who serve only the
domestic market. The fractions of entrants who export or invest in foreign countries
are represented, respectively, by the area between 1/aX and 1/aI,a n db yt h ea r e a
above 1/aI.
Having solved for the cutoﬀs and the demand level B, we can then determine the
number of entrants in every country as a function of country size. To characterize the









where Ei is the aggregate level of spending in country i, pi (v) is the consumer price of
variety v in country i,a n dni is the number of brands available to consumers in country
i. Since there are no pure proﬁts in equilibrium, spending equals labor income: Ei = Li.
It then follows from (11) that the numbers of entrants in country i, ni
E, i =1 ,2,...,N,
9are the solution of the linear system

     

vD vIX ··· vIX
vIX vD
... . . .
. . . ... ... vIX
vIX ··· vIX vD

     

























     

,
where vD = V (aD) >v IX = V (aI)+τ1−ε[V (aX) − V (aI)].18 So long as the diﬀerences
in the Lis are not too large, the number of entrants that solve this system is positive















where det(v) is the determinant of the matrix v that has vD as the diagonal elements
and vIX as the oﬀ-diagonal elements. Since vD >v IX > 0, this determinant must be
positive. Evidently, ni
E is positive when all countries are of equal size. We assume that
the diﬀerences in size are small enough so that ni
E > 0 for every country.19
18Recall that all brands that are produced in country i,b yd o m e s t i cﬁrms or by foreign subsidiaries,
have a consumer price of a/α when the producer’s labor cost is a per unit output, and all imported











































(N − 1)vIX + vD
∀i.
Since vD >v IX, the right-hand side of this inequality is smaller than 1/N, and therefore the inequality
is satisﬁed when Li is the same in all countries.
This assumption is not essential, however. Without it, the number of entrants is positive for the
largest countries and zero for the smaller countries. The arguments that follow then apply only to the
set of countries with positive entry.
102.1.1 Home Market Eﬀects
Equation (12) implies that more ﬁrms enter in larger countries and that ni/Li >n j/Lj
for Li >L j; that is, in a cross-country comparison, the number of entrants rises more
than proportionately with country size. Since the cutoﬀ coeﬃcients al, l = D,X,I,a n d
the distribution function G(·) are the same in all countries, the number of ﬁrms that
exit, the number of ﬁrms that serve only the domestic market, the number of ﬁrms that
export, and the number of ﬁrms that invest in foreign countries are all proportional to
the number of entrants. In addition, the demand level coeﬃcient B is also the same
in all countries. Therefore aggregate sales of country-i—based ﬁrms are proportional to
ni
E. Moreover, their sales in the domestic market are proportional to ni
E,t h e i re x p o r t s
are proportional to ni
E, and foreign sales of their multinational subsidiaries are also
proportional to ni
E. It follows that larger countries have proportionately larger sales in
each one of these categories.
Now deﬁne ni
O = G(aD)ni











E +[G(aD) − G(aX)]ni
E as the num-
ber of ﬁrms doing business in country i.T h e r a t i o ni
O/ni
B is then higher in larger
countries. That is, the larger a country the larger the number of its active ﬁrms rel-
ative to the number of ﬁrms that operate in the country. Also note that ni
B is larger
in larger countries, which implies that consumers in larger countries enjoy a larger
product variety range and higher welfare.20
Next consider relative market shares. Let σi
D b et h em a r k e ts h a r eo fd o m e s t i cﬁrms
in country i,l e tσi
X be the market share of foreign exporters in country i,a n dl e tσi
I
be the market share of foreign multinationals in country i (these shares must sum to




is lower in bigger countries. This result is






























It follows that the larger is country i, the larger the market share of its ﬁrms in the
domestic market, and the smaller the market share of foreign exporters and foreign
multinationals. Moreover, the market shares of foreign exporters and foreign multi-
nationals are equi-proportionately smaller, because σi
X/σi
I is independent of country
size.
2.1.2 Exports Versus FDI Sales
We now consider the relative magnitude of exports and local FDI sales for a pair of
countries i and j.L e ts
ij
X b et h em a r k e ts h a r ei nc o u n t r yj of country i’s exporters and
let s
ij
I be the market share in country j of aﬃliates of country i’s multinationals. The















Given our symmetry assumptions on technologies and international transaction costs,
this ratio is independent of i and j: every country has the same relative sales of
exporters and aﬃliates in every other country. This ratio rises with the exporting
cutoﬀ coeﬃcient aX and declines with the FDI cutoﬀ coeﬃcient aI.T h e c u t o ﬀs, in
turn, are determined by the system of equilibrium conditions (7)-(10). This system can
therefore be used to assess the consequences of changes in the costs of international
transactions fI,f X, and τ.
A rise in the export costs fX or τ, or a decrease in the FDI costs fI,a l lh a v e
similar impacts on the aX and aI cutoﬀs: they induce an increase in aI and a decrease
12in aX.21 The relative sales of exporters thus decline in all these cases. Recall that
fI encompasses both the country-level ﬁxed costs embodied in fX and the duplicate
plant overhead costs represented by fD. It is therefore natural to consider the eﬀects
of equivalent increases in fI and fX (representing higher country-level costs) and the
eﬀects of equivalent decreases in fI and fD (representing lower overhead plant costs,
and hence smaller returns to scale). Again, system (7)-(10) can be used to show that
the aI and aX cutoﬀs move in the same directions as before, entailing a decrease in
relative export sales.
These are sensible comparative statics predicting the cross-sectoral variation in
relative exports sales. We expect the relative sales of exporters to be lower in sectors
with higher transport costs or higher ﬁxed country-level costs (even when the latter
costs are also borne by multinational aﬃliates). We also expect them to be lower
in sectors where plant-level returns to scale are relatively weak. These results show
how the ﬁrm-level proximity—concentration tradeoﬀ results can be extended to sectoral
levels. In a departure from the previous literature, however, these predictions are now
based on the aggregation across heterogeneous ﬁrms that select diﬀerent modes of
foreign market access (FDI or exports).
W en o ws h i f tt h ef o c u st ot h er o l eo fﬁrm-level heterogeneity in explaining the cross-
sectoral variation in relative export sales. Note from (13) that the function V (·) directly
impacts the relative sales (holding the cutoﬀ levels ﬁxed). Recall also that ﬁrm sales
and variable proﬁts are proportional to a1−ε in every market. V (a) therefore captures
(up to a multiplicative constant) the distribution of sales and variable proﬁts among
ﬁrms that make the same export or FDI decisions. It also captures the distribution
of domestic sales and variable proﬁts among all surviving ﬁrms. We think of V (a) as
summarizing ﬁrm-level heterogeneity in a sector. It is exogenously determined by the
distribution of unit costs G(a) and the elasticity of substitution ε,w h i c hm a g n i ﬁes
21Given (7)-(9), it can be shown that shifts in the cutoﬀs al, l = D,X,I,h a v en oﬁrst-order eﬀect
on equation (10). Therefore (10) can be used to directly calculate the shifts in B in response to
changes in any of the exogenous parameters. An increase in τ therefore induces an increase in B and
a decrease in τ1−εB. The direction of the change in the cutoﬀs aX and aI is then immediate from (8)
and (9). Similarly, an increase in fX will induce an increase in B and a decrease in B/fX; a decrease
in fI will induce a decrease in B and an increase in B/(fI − fX).T h ee ﬀects of these changes on the
cutoﬀs are then once more directly obtained from (8) and (9).
13diﬀerences in ﬁrm-level outcomes that are induced by G(a).
In order to index diﬀerences in ﬁrm-level heterogeneity across sectors, we parame-
trize V (a) by parametrizing the distribution G(a). We use the Pareto distribution as
a benchmark. When labor productivity 1/a is drawn from a Pareto distribution with
the shape parameter k, the distribution of ﬁrm domestic sales, indexed by V (a),i sa l s o
Pareto, with the shape parameter k − (ε − 1).22 The shape parameter of the Pareto
distribution oﬀers a natural and convenient index of dispersion, which we will use to
characterize heterogeneity. Given our assumptions, the domestic sales of all ﬁrms with
sales above any given cutoﬀ are distributed Pareto with the same shape parameter
k − (ε − 1). A higher dispersion of ﬁrm productivity-draws (lower k)o rah i g h e re l a s -
ticity of substitution ε,r a i s et h ed i s p e r s i o no fﬁrm domestic sales and variable proﬁts.
We now investigate the impact of such changes in heterogeneity on the relative sales
of exporters.
The Pareto distribution implies that V (a1)/V (a2) equals (a1/a2)
k−(ε−1) for every a1
and a2 in the support of the distribution of productivity-draws. Relative export sales



























Comparative statics on (14) predict that relative export sales decrease with decreases
in k and increases in ε.24 Thus, we expect sectors with higher levels of dispersion in







,f o r x ≥ b>0 ,
where b is a scale parameter that bounds the support [b,+∞) from below. logx is then distributed
exponentially with a standard deviation equal to 1/k. Any truncation from below of X is also dis-
tributed Pareto with the same shape parameter k. X has a ﬁnite variance if and only if k>2.W e
t h e r e f o r ea s s u m et h a tk>ε+1 , which ensures that both the distribution of productivity draws and
the distribution of ﬁrm sales have ﬁnite variances.
23Equations (8) and (9) are used in this derivation.




is greater than 1, by assumption; see (1).
14ﬁrm domestic sales – generated either by higher dispersion levels of ﬁrm productivity
or by a higher elasticity of substitution – to have lower levels of relative export sales.
This is a major implication of our model. It highlights the importance of ﬁrm-level
heterogeneity, which we will test.
2.2 Testable Implications
We focus our empirical work on the model’s predictions concerning the determinants
of the cross-sector and cross-country variation in relative export sales. This empirical
analysis requires us to relax the symmetry assumptions imposed in the previous section
and to allow for cross-country variation in wages, transport costs, and technology.
Consider the decisions of U.S. ﬁrms in sector h to serve country j via export sales








































where wU and wj are the wage levels in the U.S. and country j, τ
Uj
h is the trade
cost (transport and tariﬀ) from the U.S. to country j in sector h, εh is the elasticity
of substitution across varieties in sector h (common to all countries), B
j
h indexes the




X represent the ﬁxed costs of doing
FDI in and exporting to country j. These conditions replace (8) and (9). Note that f
j
hI
is also indexed by sector h, since it includes plant setup and overhead production costs.
On the other hand, the ﬁxed exporting costs are common across sectors; they index
particular characteristics of doing business in country j for U.S. ﬁrms. These costs

































15where ωj ≡ wU/wj indexes the U.S. wage relative to country j.

















, which ensures that there
exist U.S. ﬁrms that prefer export to FDI in country j;
• wUτ
Uj
h /wj > 1, which ensures that there exist ﬁr m st h a tc h o o s et ol o c a t ei n
country j;a n d
• wjτ
jU
h /wU > 1, which ensures that there exist ﬁrms that choose to locate in the
U.S.25
We index the level of U.S. ﬁrm heterogeneity across sectors using the Pareto bench-
m a r k .W ea s s u m et h a tt h ep r o d u c t i v i t y - d r a w sf o rU . S .ﬁrms in sector h are distributed
Pareto with shape kU
h , and therefore that the distribution of U.S. domestic sales in-
dexed by V U
h (a) is also Pareto with shape kU
h − (εh − 1).T h es a l e so fU . S .e x p o r t e r s



























































Comparing (14) and (18) conﬁrms that all our previously derived comparative stat-
ics remain valid in a cross-section of both sectors and non-symmetric countries: the
proximity—concentration forces predict lower U.S. relative export sales for country-
sector pairs with high transport costs τ
Uj
h ,c o u n t r i e sw i t hh i g hﬁxed costs f
j
X,a n d
sectors with low plant-level returns to scale fhP.A sw a sp r e v i o u s l yt h ec a s e ,t h ee x -
tent of ﬁrm-level heterogeneity remains an important determinant of relative export
25The relative wage wU/wj must be measured in eﬀective units of labor (adjusted for productivity
and human capital diﬀerences). In our sample of countries the diﬀerences in productivity adjusted
relative wages are small. In any case, our second and third conditions ensure that the relative wages
are bounded by transport costs.
16sales. Sectors with higher productivity dispersion levels (lower kU
h ) or higher elastic-
ities of substitution have lower relative export sales. We cannot separately measure
kU
h and εh. However, we can measure their diﬀerence kU




h − (εh − 1)
¤
then indexes the measurable dispersion of ﬁrm
size in sector h.
3D a t a
To test our multisector, multicountry model, we require data that varies in both of these
dimensions. The data required fall into roughly three categories: data on the composi-
tion of international commerce across countries and sectors, measures for key variables
aﬀecting the proximity—concentration tradeoﬀ, and indices capturing diﬀerences in the
extent of ﬁrm-level heterogeneity across sectors. In this section, we describe our choice
of data in this order. Unless otherwise noted, all of the data described below are for
the single year 1994.
3.1 The Composition of International Commerce
The biggest constraint on any analysis that considers the tradeoﬀ between exports and
FDI sales is the dearth of internationally comparable measures of the extent of FDI
across both industries and countries. Because the U.S. is one of only a handful of coun-
tries that collects multinational aﬃliate sales data disaggregated by both destination
and by industry, our study covers only the composition of U.S. international commerce.
In the United States, the organization that collects census-type data on FDI is the
Bureau of Economic Analysis (BEA). In its Benchmark surveys conducted every ﬁve
years, the BEA collects aﬃliate-level data on a wide range of enterprise-level variables
including total aﬃliate sales. Aﬃliates are classiﬁed by their main line of business and
assigned to one of 52 manufacturing classiﬁc a t i o n s ,w h i c ha r es h o w ni nt a b l e1 . T o
make this FDI data comparable to the data for exports, we aggregated the ﬁrm-level
multinational sales data to the industry level. Our export data are more familiar and
have been taken from Feenstra (1997). The data have been concorded from 4-digit
17SITC industrial classiﬁcations into the BEA industry classiﬁcations shown in table 1.
Finally, we consider two separate samples of countries, which can roughly be char-
acterized as narrow and wide. The narrow sample consists of the 27 countries originally
considered by Brainard (1997) while the wide sample includes 11 additional countries,
which are smaller and typically less developed. The country coverage is shown in table
2. The beneﬁt of the wider sample is that it includes a larger and more diverse set
of countries while the drawback is that these countries are more likely to have fewer
strictly positive levels of FDI, creating some concern about censoring.
3.2 proximity—concentration Variables
Our theoretical model predicts exports relative to FDI sales as a function of the costs
of each activity: unit costs of exporting, ﬁxed costs of exporting, and ﬁxed costs of
investment abroad. These costs are not easily quantiﬁed, however. We therefore need
to discuss our choice of proxies in some detail.
First consider unit costs of foreign trade. These costs can be either due to the costs
of moving goods across borders, such as transport and insurance, or due to barriers
created by destination-country governments, such as tariﬀs. We proxy for them with
the variables FREIGHT and TARIFF, respectively, where FREIGHT is an ad-valorem
measure of freight and insurance costs and TARIFF is an ad-valorem measure of trade
taxes. FREIGHT is computed as the ratio of CIF imports into the United States to
FOB imports, which is calculated from the data presented in Feenstra (1997). TARIFF
is calculated at the BEA industry/country-level from more ﬁnely disaggregated data.
It is the unweighted average of tariﬀs across sub-industries within the BEA industry.
Trade taxes are taken from Yeaple (2000), where the data are described in more detail.
While the unit costs of shipping goods are reasonably straightforward to measure,
the same cannot be said for the ﬁxed costs associated with exporting and foreign direct
investment. In principle, these costs could vary by both industry and country, but
such measures do not exist in practice. To make progress, we begin by assuming that
there is a country-speciﬁc ﬁxed cost associated with any form of commerce involving
that country. This country-speciﬁc ﬁxed cost applies to both exports and FDI sales.
18Having assumed that this measure is unobserved, country-speciﬁc, and yet common to
all industries, we subsume this measure into a country ﬁxed eﬀect.
We assume that any remaining cost associated with FDI stems from the cost of
maintaining additional capacity. The diﬃculty associated with choosing a proxy for
plant-level ﬁxed costs is that there is no such thing as a representative ﬁrm in our
model. It is therefore important to ﬁnd a measure of plant-level ﬁxed costs that is
independent of any particular ﬁrm’s size or level of productivity. This means that
standard measures of these costs, such as the number of production workers at a plant
of median size, are not appropriate. Instead, we follow the model in choosing the
number of non-production workers per establishment as reported in the 1997 Census
of Manufacturing.26 We calculate the average number of non-production workers at
the NAICS level.27 Then we compute our measure of plant-level ﬁxed cost, FP, for
every BEA sector as the average of these numbers within the BEA sector, weighted by
the NAICS-level sales in this sector.
3.3 Measures of Dispersion
The most novel feature of our model is the relationship between the degree of intra-
industry ﬁrm heterogeneity and the prevalence of subsidiary sales relative to export
sales. Everything else equal, international commerce should be skewed toward FDI sales
and away from exports, in industries with greater productivity heterogeneity across
ﬁrms. To test this hypothesis, we require data that quantiﬁes the extent of productivity
dispersion by industry. These measures are diﬃcult to construct, because we have no
data on the intra-industry distribution of productivity. We therefore rely on guidance
from the model to construct a suitable measure of within-industry heterogeneity.
A c c o r d i n gt ot h em o d e l ,d i ﬀerences in ﬁrm size reﬂect diﬀerences in productivity,
b e c a u s em o r ep r o d u c t i v eﬁrms sell more. This mapping – from the distribution of
productivity to the distribution of ﬁrm size – depends, however, on the elasticity of
26This measure does not strictly conform to our modeling assumptions, because the number of
non-production workers is not independent of establishment size.
27The new 6-digit North American Industrial Classiﬁcation System replaces the 4-digit Standard
Industrial Classiﬁcation, but provides roughly the same level of industry aggregation.
19substitution among products within an industry. Fortunately, our analysis shows that
this coeﬃcient can be recovered from data on the size distribution of ﬁrms, which are
available, and which we use in the following analysis.
To quantify the extent of dispersion within an industry, we assume that the sto-
chastic process that determines ﬁrm productivity levels is Pareto, with the shape of
the distribution varying across industries. This assumption is convenient, because it
suggests two conceptually equivalent ways to measure dispersion. The ﬁrst is to regress
the logarithm of an individual ﬁrm’s rank within the distribution on the logarithm of
the ﬁrm’s size. It can be shown that the estimated coeﬃcient of such a regression is
k−(ε − 1), which is exactly the measure of dispersion that appears in the reduced form
of the model.28 The second method is to compute the standard deviation of the loga-
rithm of ﬁrm sales, which – given our distributional assumption – is computationally
equivalent to the slope of the conditional expectation of log rank on log size.29
While our distributional assumption yields a precise methodology for computing
dispersion, the choice of data is more problematic. We require disaggregated data on
the distribution of sales across ﬁrms. We have no access to these data for U.S. ﬁrms,
however. As a result, we rely on two alternative sources.
First, we use the publicly available data from the 1997 U.S. Census of Manufac-
turing. Unfortunately, these data report only the number of establishments that fall
into 10 diﬀerent size-categories, which makes it impossible to estimate size disper-
sion measures by regressing log rank on log sales. Nevertheless, by making additional
assumptions one can compute the inverse of the standard deviation of log sales. In par-
ticular, assume that all establishments that fall within the same size-category have log
sales equal to the center of this category. Then one can treat each of the size-categories
in the many subindustries of the BEA industry classiﬁcation as separate observations.
Adopting this method, we calculate the inverse of the standard deviation of log sales
using the number of ﬁrms in each size-category as weights.
28It is comforting that the distribution of ﬁrm size closely follows a Pareto distribution; see Axtell
(2001).
29While the two methods of calculation should be equivalent in practice, there are moderate to
small diﬀerences in the measures. We therefore calculate them both ways.
20Second, Bureau van Dijck Electronic Publishing has recently made available a large
data set of European ﬁrms.30 This database, named Amadeus, includes information on
the consolidated sales, the national identity, and the main line of business by industry
of a large number of European ﬁrms.31 There are roughly 260,000 ﬁr m si nt h i ss a m p l e .
We compute each of our two measures of dispersion for every industry in two subsets
of these data: all Western European ﬁrms and French ﬁrms only. We compute our
ﬁrm dispersion measures using French ﬁrms only for two reasons. First, using data
for multiple countries raises the issue of industrial composition. Within every BEA
industry there are many subindustries for which countries might produce diﬀerent
mixes. France’s industrial structure is very similar to the U.S., however, and so might
share most of the same distributional aspects of ﬁrm characteristics. Second, French
ﬁrms are highly overrepresented in the sample relative to all other Western European
countries.32 Our dispersion measures are based on a sample of 55,339 large Western
European ﬁrms, and a subset of 15,148 French ﬁrms.33
The regression-based measure of dispersion provides a natural way of evaluating the
cross-sectional variation in this variable relative to the measurement errors induced by
ﬁtting the Pareto distribution. Figure 3, which has been constructed from the sample
of Western European ﬁrms, plots ﬁrm rank against ﬁrm sales in 4 sectors on the same
log-log scale. In every plot the dispersion measure is represented by the slope of the
regression line while its goodness of ﬁt is represented by the deviation from linearity.
Figure 4 quantiﬁes this comparison by showing the 95% conﬁdence interval around the
coeﬃcient of dispersion, estimated as the slope of the regression line in each one of
the sectors. Evidently, these slopes are precisely estimated in all the sectors, with the
30This data set has recently been used by Budd, Konings and Slaughter (2002), who investigate
international rent-sharing within multinational ﬁrms. We thank Matthew Slaughter for bringing this
data set to our attention.
31Both Western and Eastern European ﬁrms are represented.
32Due to national diﬀerences in reporting requirements, no information on U.K. ﬁr m si sa v a i l a b l e ,
and only an extremely limited number of German ﬁrms appear in the sample.
33Because small ﬁrms are underrepresented throughout the Amadeus database, we ﬁrst drop ﬁrms
with sales below a cutoﬀ of U.S. $2.5 million per year. Note that, under the assumption of a Pareto
size distribution, our measures of dispersion are invariant to the choice of lower bound cutoﬀ.W e
computed the dispersion measures using several diﬀerent cutoﬀs. Any cutoﬀ above U.S. $2.5 million
yields a size distribution that is closely approximated by a Pareto distribution, and a dispersion
measure that varies very little with the cutoﬀ.
21exception of ﬁve outliers that we shall discuss below.34
There are 4 measures of dispersion calculated from the Amadeus data and one
measure calculated from the U.S. data.35 The correlations between these measures
are shown in table 3 (along with our measure of plant-level ﬁx e dc o s t s ,F P ,a n dt h e
industries’ capital-labor ratio, KL, and R&D intensity, RD). The table shows that all 4
measures from Amadeus are highly correlated with one another, as one might expect.
The table also shows that the U.S.-based measure of dispersion is positively correlated
with the measures of dispersion calculated from the European data, except that this
correlation is not as high as the correlations among the 4 measures of dispersion that
were calculated from the European data. There are at least two reasons why this
m i g h tb es o .F i r s t ,t h em e t h o do fc a l c u l a t i o ni sv e r yd i ﬀerent: the European measures
are computed from actual ﬁrm-level data while the American measure is calculated
from semi-aggregated establishment-level data. Given the diﬀerences in methods of
calculation, one might argue that the correlations are surprisingly high. Second, there
exists an aggregation problem. If the composition of output varies across countries
according to comparative advantage, then within each BEA industry the product mix
o fg o o d sp r o d u c e di nt h eU . S .m a yd i ﬀer from the mix produced in Europe. For this
reason the European and American dispersion measures cannot be perfectly aligned.
4S p e c i ﬁcations and Results
Our aim is to estimate a linearized version of (18) that relates the logarithm of relative
sales to our measure of ﬁrm-size dispersion, the logarithm of our proxy for plant ﬁxed
costs, the logarithms of transport and tariﬀ costs, and a set of country dummies that
we use to control for the diﬀerences in fX and ω across countries. Of course, this
linearization precludes any structural interpretation of the estimated parameters. Our
goal is limited to testing whether the central tendencies in the data are consistent with
34As all 52 manufacturing sectors could not ﬁt on one graph, only one of the seven food processing
sectors (201 — meat products) is represented. The coeﬃcients and conﬁdence intervals for the other
six sectors are very similar to the one represented.
35All the dispersion measures are reported in an appendix table.
22the partial derivatives implied by (18) and to assessing the economic signiﬁcance of the
magnitudes associated with the estimated coeﬃcients.
We consider several variants of the basic speciﬁcation in order to raise the level of
conﬁdence in the results. Given the critical importance of the size distribution of ﬁrms,
we report results corresponding to each one of the ﬁve measures of dispersion in ﬁrm
size. We also report results for both samples of countries: narrow and wide. Finally,
we explore the sensitivity of the results to alternative assumptions that incorporate
other determinants of relative sales not captured by equation (18).
We begin the analysis by considering the raw speciﬁcation in which we do not
attempt to control for any variables that might aﬀect the tradeoﬀ between exporting
and FDI sales. The results across speciﬁcations for our two samples and ﬁve measures
of dispersion are shown in table 4. The columns correspond to diﬀerent measures of
dispersion, beginning with the U.S. standard deviation of log sales, proceeding to the
European and French-only standard deviation measures, and ending with the estimated
distribution parameters for the European and the French-only sample, respectively.
Country ﬁxed eﬀects are not reported.
First consider the narrow sample of relatively large countries, studied by Brainard
(1997). The coeﬃcients on FREIGHT and TARIFF are negative and statistically sig-
niﬁcant in each one of the ﬁve speciﬁcations. These results are consistent with Brainard
(1997). In addition, the coeﬃcient of FP is positive and signiﬁcant. We therefore con-
ﬁrm the predictions of the proximity—concentration tradeoﬀ: ﬁrms substitute FDI sales
for exports when the costs of international trade are relatively high and the returns to
scale are relatively small.
Next consider the eﬀects of dispersion. The estimated coeﬃcients on the various
dispersion measures are all negative and statistically signiﬁcant. Industries in which
ﬁrm size is highly dispersed are associated with relatively more FDI sales relative to
exports, precisely as the model predicts. None of these results changes signiﬁcantly
when the set of countries is expanded to include the 11 smaller countries (the wide
country sample).36
36The magnitude of the coeﬃcients on virtually all dispersion measures are lower in the wider sample.
23Although all measures of dispersion yield coeﬃcients that are statistically signif-
icant, the choice of dispersion measure has a noticeable impact on the results. The
measures that were derived by ﬁt t i n gaP a r e t od i s t r i b u t i o nt od a t ao nﬁrm size yield
substantially lower coeﬃcients and higher standard errors than the nonparametric dis-
persion measures, i.e., the standard deviations of log sales. This pattern is driven, in
large part, by ﬁve sectors that exhibit the largest diﬀerences between the measure-
ment of dispersion by means of the shape of a Pareto distribution and by means of
the standard deviation, for both Western European and French ﬁrms.37 These sectors
have the lowest number of ﬁrms in the data, and they yield – without exception –
the poorest ﬁts to the Pareto distribution, as measured by R-squares. We believe that
in these cases the nonparametric measures (the standard deviations) better describe
the levels of dispersion within the sectors. Dropping these ﬁve outliers from the sam-
ple and reestimating the equations, we ﬁnd that the two diﬀerent ways of measuring
dispersion yield much more similar results. After dropping the outliers, all the disper-
sion measures yield negative coeﬃcients that are signiﬁcant beyond the 99% conﬁdence
level.
To get a sense of the economic signiﬁcance of the estimated coeﬃcients on our dis-
persion measures, we have calculated standardized coeﬃcients – also known as “beta”
coeﬃcients – for all the independent variables. They are reported in table 5 for the
narrow sample, along with the sample means and standard deviations. A beta coeﬃ-
cient is deﬁned as the product of the estimated coeﬃcient and the standard deviation
of its corresponding independent variable, divided by the standard deviation of the de-
pendent variable. It converts the regression coeﬃcients into units of sample standard
deviations.38 These beta coeﬃcients suggest that each one of the ﬁve measures of dis-
persion has a comparable impact to each one of the standard proximity—concentration
One possible explanation is that attenuation bias has aﬀected the magnitudes of the coeﬃcients.
Another explanation is that the process generating FDI in the smaller developing countries is somewhat
diﬀerent from the process generating FDI in the larger developed countries.
37The ﬁve outliers consist of the following sectors: 210 - tobacco, 369 - other electronics, 379 - other
transport equipment, 381 - scientiﬁc and measuring equipment, and 386 - optical and photographic
equipment.
38See Wooldridge (2003, Section 6.1) for a further description of this transformation.
24variables.39 For instance, a one standard deviation increase in an industry’s freight
cost is generally associated with a third of a standard deviation increase in the loga-
rithm of the ratio of exports to FDI sales. A one standard deviation increase in the
dispersion measures induce similar (though, on average, slightly smaller) changes in
the dependent variable. The impact of tariﬀs and returns to scale are, in turn, similar,
although somewhat smaller than the impact of the dispersion measures. Taken as a
whole, these results suggest that ﬁrm-level heterogeneity adds an important dimension
to the observed tradeoﬀ between exports and FDI sales.
These results strongly support the theoretical model’s predicted link between ﬁrm-
level heterogeneity and the ratio of exports relative to FDI sales. Nevertheless, these
results have to be interpreted with caution, because they may also reﬂect – at least
to some degree – variations in industry characteristics that are not captured by our
parsimonious model. Cross-industry variations in capital and R&D intensity may, for
example, contribute to the observed variations in relative export and FDI sales. Note
that both these variables represent characteristics of an industry’s technology that are
not captured by our model.40 Furthermore, as shown in table 3, these measures of
technology are correlated with all the diﬀerent dispersion measures, although the cor-
relations with the U.S.-data—based dispersion measure is rather weak.41 We therefore
rerun our previous speciﬁcation, controlling for both capital and R&D intensities.
Table 6 reports the results. Evidently, all the dispersion measures remain highly
signiﬁcant. As was the case in the baseline speciﬁcation, the measurement problems
associated with the regression-based dispersion measures aﬀect the results for these
variables (the magnitude of the coeﬃcients is signiﬁcantly lower). When the ﬁve outlier
sectors are removed from the sample, however, the diﬀerence in the coeﬃcients shrinks
considerably while all coeﬃcients remain signiﬁcant beyond the 99% conﬁdence level.
39In the case of FREIGHT, TARIFF, and FP, the coeﬃcients are averaged across the ﬁve speciﬁ-
cations.
40We have restricted our choice of controls to the measurable characteristics of sectors that are
o u t s i d et h es c o p eo ft h em o d e l ,a n dw eh a v ee x c l u d e d attributes that are predicted to endogenously
respond to changes in the model’s exogenous variables.
41Capital intensity is measured as the industry’s aggregate capital to labor ratio (from the NBER
productivity database) and R&D intensity is measured as the ratio of R&D expenditures to sales
(from a 1978 FTC survey).
25The results also suggest that R&D intensity is not a useful predictor of the extent of
exports versus FDI sales, while industries that are capital intensive are much more
likely to substitute FDI for export sales. These results are interesting, but we will not
discuss them further, because our theoretical model oﬀers no guidance concerning their
interpretation.
Of course, diﬀerences in capital intensity may not be the only other source of
variation across sectors that aﬀects exports relative to FDI sales. In order to address the
possibility that some other unmeasured characteristics of sectors fall into this category,
we estimated the previous speciﬁcation (with the capital and R&D intensity controls)
adding random industry eﬀects. A beneﬁt of this estimation strategy is that it allows for
eﬃcient estimation in the presence of common components in the residuals that might
be induced by unmeasured industry characteristics. To validate this speciﬁcation, we
need to assume that these unmeasured industry characteristics are uncorrelated with
our right-hand-side variables. This is a strong assumption. We feel, however, that it
is most likely to hold for our dispersion measures, which are the focus of our empirical
analysis.42
The results are reported in table 7. As could be predicted, the standard errors
have increased. But so have the point estimates of the impact of dispersion on exports
relative to FDI sales. Importantly, however, the coeﬃcients for all the dispersion mea-
sures remain highly signiﬁcant. On the other hand, the magnitude of the coeﬃcients
on FREIGHT and TARIFF are greatly reduced, and the coeﬃcients on TARIFF are
no longer signiﬁcant. These results support our earlier conclusion that the economic
signiﬁcance of ﬁrm heterogeneity compares favorably with the eﬀect of the standard
proximity—concentration variables in the export versus FDI sales tradeoﬀ.
Another robustness check addresses the potential interdependence of the residuals
across countries, which may exist even after we control for country ﬁxed eﬀects. This
type of interdependence pattern could be created by the ability of aﬃliates to reexport
a portion of their production to a third country. In this case, a ﬁrm’s decision to
42The inclusion of industry ﬁxed eﬀects would eliminate the need for this assumption, but would
also preclude any identiﬁcation of sector-level characteristics, such as our dispersion measures.
26operate an aﬃliate in one country, say Belgium, would not be independent from its
decision to locate aﬃliates in other neighboring European countries. In the appendix,
we show that the predicted link between ﬁrm-level heterogeneity within sectors and
exports relative to FDI sales is theoretically consistent with an extended version of
the model that explicitly allows for reexports by aﬃliates. However, the pattern of
interdependence may be particularly strong among the overrepresented and highly
integrated economies of Western Europe.
To address this concern, we treat all the Western European countries as a single
aggregate unit and reestimate our speciﬁcation with the industry controls (capital and
R&D intensity) and industry random eﬀects. The results are reported in table 8. Once
again, all the dispersion measures remain highly signiﬁcant. As could be predicted, the
point estimates on the dispersion measures are slightly lower, which reﬂects the fact
that the smaller developing countries now receive a greater weight in the sample.
Our ﬁnal robustness check addresses sources of endogeneity bias in the dispersion
measures, including measurement error. To address these concerns, we instrument the
U.S. dispersion measure using all four of the European dispersion measures. We also use
ad i ﬀerent method to control for the potential correlation of the residuals within sectors
by adjusting the standard errors for clustering (within sectors).43 These speciﬁcations
are reported in table 9 for all previously described country samples (narrow, wide, and
aggregated Europe). Instrumenting the U.S. dispersion measure signiﬁcantly increases
the magnitude of both the estimated coeﬃcient and its standard error. However, as
in all the previous speciﬁcations, the eﬀect of dispersion on relative exports and FDI
sales remains statistically signiﬁcant.
Finally, we brieﬂy report a number of other robustness checks that we performed,
but have chosen not to report in detail (in order to save space). One potential compli-
cation arises from the fact that ﬁrms engage in intra-ﬁrm trade in intermediate inputs.
This trade does not appear in our model, but is of suﬃcient size in a number of in-
dustries to be of concern. We found that netting out the value of these imports from
43Under our assumptions on the source of this potential correlation in the residuals – unmeasured
sector characteristics – the previously reported random eﬀects coeﬃcients are the eﬃcient estimators.
27our FDI sales data had no appreciable impact on the dispersion coeﬃcients, although
it had a small impact on the size of the FREIGHT and TARIFF coeﬃcients. In other
speciﬁcations, we included the 4-ﬁrm concentration ratio as a control, in order to assess
whether our measures of ﬁrm heterogeneity oﬀer information in excess of this crude
measure of concentration. We found that controlling for concentration reduces the
point estimates of the coeﬃcients on the dispersion measures, but that this decline is
rather small.
5C o n c l u s i o n
We have developed in this paper a model of international trade in which ﬁrms can
choose to serve the domestic market, to export, or to engage in FDI in order to serve
foreign markets. Every industry is populated by heterogenous ﬁrms, which diﬀer in
productivity levels. As a result, ﬁrms sort according to productivity into diﬀerent
organizational forms. The least productive ﬁrms leave the industry, because they
cannot generate positive operating proﬁts no matter how they organize. Other low-
productivity ﬁrms choose to serve only the domestic market. The remaining ﬁrms serve
the domestic market as well as foreign markets. Their mode of operation in foreign
markets diﬀers, however. The most productive ﬁrms in the group choose to invest in
foreign markets while the less productive ﬁr m sc h o o s et oe x p o r t .
Our model embodies standard elements of the proximity—concentration tradeoﬀ in
the theory of horizontal foreign direct investment. As a result, it predicts that foreign
markets are served more by exports relative to FDI sales when trade frictions are
lower or economies of scale are higher. To these factors our model adds a role for the
within-sectoral heterogeneity of the productivity levels of ﬁrms, which induces a size
distribution of ﬁrms that also aﬀects exports versus FDI sales.
Using data on exports versus FDI sales of U.S. ﬁr m si n3 8c o u n t r i e sa n d5 2i n d u s -
tries, we estimated the eﬀects of trade frictions, economies of scale and within-industry
dispersion of ﬁrm size on exports versus FDI sales. The results support the theoretical
predictions. In particular, they show a robust cross-sectoral relationship between the
28degree of dispersion in ﬁrm size and the tendency of ﬁr m st os u b s t i t u t eF D Is a l e sf o r
exports. The size of this eﬀect is of the same order of magnitude as trade frictions.
W et h e r e f o r ec o n c l u d et h a tw eh a v ei d e n t i ﬁed a new element, namely, within-sectoral
heterogeneity, that plays an important role in the structure of foreign trade and invest-
ment.
29References
Axtell, Robert L. 2001. “Zipf Distribution of U.S. Firm Sizes.” Science 293:1818—1820.
Bernard, Andrew B., Jonathan Eaton, J. Bradford Jenson and Samuel Kortum. 2000.
“Plants and Productivity in International Trade.” NBER Working Paper No. 7688.
Brainard, S. Lael. 1993. “A Simple Theory of Multinational Corporations and Trade
with a Trade-Oﬀ Between Proximity and Concentration.” NBER Working Paper
No. 4269.
Brainard, S. Lael. 1997. “An Empirical Assessment of the Proximity-Concentration
Trade-oﬀ between Multinational Sales and Trade.” American Economic Review
87:520—44.
Budd, John W., Jozef Konings and Matthew J. Slaughter. 2002. “International Rent
Sharing in Multinational Firms.” NBER Working Paper No. 8809.
Doms, Mark E. and J. Bradford Jensen. 1998. “Comparing Wages, Skills, and Produc-
tivity between Domestically and Foreign-Owned Manufacturing Establishments in
the United States”. In Geography and ownership as bases for economic account-
ing, ed. Robert E. Baldwin, Robert E. Lipsey and J. David Richardson. NBER
Studies in Income and Wealth, vol. 59, University of Chicago Press.
Ethier, Wilfred J. 1986. “The Multinational Firm.” The Quarterly Journal of Eco-
nomics 101:805—33.
Ethier, Wilfred J. and James R. Markusen. 1996. “Multinational Firms, Technology
Diﬀusion and Trade.” Journal of International Economics 41:1—28.
Feenstra, Robert C. 1997. “U.S. Exports, 1972-1994: With State Exports and Other
U.S. Data.” NBER Working Paper No. 5990.
Girma, Sourafel, Steve Thompson and Peter W. Wright. 2002. “Why are Productivity
and Wages Higher in Foreign Firms?” T h eE c o n o m i ca n dS o c i a lR e v i e w33:93—100.
Hanson, Gordon H., Raymond J. Mataloni and Matthew J. Slaughter. 2002. “Verti-
cal Specialization in Multinational Firms.” Mimeo, University of California, San
Diego.
Helpman, Elhanan. 1984. “A Simple Theory of International Trade with Multinational
Corporations.” Journal of Political Economy 92:451—71.
Helpman, Elhanan. 1985. “Multinational Corporations and Trade Structure.” The
Review of Economic Studies 52:443—57.
Horstmann, Ignatius and James R. Markusen. 1987. “Licensing versus Direct Invest-
ment: A Model of Internalization by the Multinational Enterprise.” Canadian
Journal of Economics 20:464—81.
30Horstmann, Ignatius and James R. Markusen. 1992. “Endogenous Market Structures
in International Trade.” Journal of International Economics 32:109—29.
Markusen, James R. 1995. “The Boundaries of Multinational Enterprises and the
Theory of International Trade.” Journal of Economic Perspectives 9:169—89.
Markusen, James R. 2002. Multinational Firms and the Theory of International Trade.
MIT Press.
Markusen, James R. and Anthony J. Venables. 2000. “The Theory of Endowment,
Intra-industry and Multi-national Trade.” Journal of International Economics
52:209—34.
Melitz, Marc J. 2002. “The Impact of Trade on Aggregate Industry Productivity and
Intra-Industry Reallocations.” NBER Working Paper No. 8881.
Rob, Rafael and Nikolaos Vettas. 2001. “Foreign Direct Investment and Exports with
Growing Demand.” CEPR Discussion Paper No. 2786.
Tybout, James R. 2002. “Plant and Firm-Level Evidence on New Trade Theories”.
In Handbook of International Economics, ed. James Harrigan. Basil-Blackwell.
Forthcoming.
Wooldridge, Jeﬀrey M. 2003. Introductory Econometrics. 2 ed. South-Western.
Yeaple, Stephen R. 2000. “The Determinants of U.S. Outward Foreign Direct In-
vestment: Market Access versus Comparative Advantage.” Mimeo, University of
Pennsylvania.
31Appendix
In this appendix, we discuss the eﬀects of ﬁrm heterogeneity on relative exports and FDI
sales when ﬁrms have an incentive to export from foreign aﬃliates to other countries.
Since our interest in this extension is motivated by our empirical work, we focus the
analysis on U.S. ﬁrms and their strategies to reach consumers in other countries. For
this purpose we do not need to construct a full general equilibrium model.
Consider an industry with nU






ﬁrms remain active and serve their U.S. domestic market, where aU
D is the solution
to ai
D from equation (2) for i = U. Firms with lower productivity levels exit. We
normalize the U.S. wage to 1.
Now suppose that every U.S. ﬁrm can also sell its products in M foreign markets;
call them European countries. All these countries are symmetrical, with the same
market demand level B. For expositional simplicity, we consider the case where the
European wage is equal to the U.S. wage, and hence also equal to 1.44 We assume
that transport costs from the U.S. to each one of the European countries is τU while
transport costs between every pair of European countries is τ,w h e r eτ<τ U.T h i s
last assumption provides the rationale for exports from European subsidiaries to other
countries in Europe. If transport costs across Europe were the same as between Europe
and the U.S., then American ﬁrms would not have any incentive to export from a
European subsidiary to another European country.




U¢1−ε B − fX
i
from exporting to the European countries. It follows that exports are proﬁtable for all
ﬁrms with a ≤ aU







B = fX. (A1)
44Relaxing this assumption would not qualitatively change any of the ensuing results.
32There are now other strategies a ﬁrm can use to serve foreign markets: it can form
a subsidiary in each one of them, which is dedicated to serving the local market; or
it can form a subsidiary in a single country and use it as an export platform to the



















1+( M − 1)τ
1−ε¤
−[fI +( M − 1)fX].
It follows from these functional forms that the proﬁt function from U.S. exports is the
ﬂattest among the three when presented in a ﬁgure such as ﬁgure 1 in the text, while
the proﬁt function from dedicated FDI is the steepest. Therefore, there may now exist
three regions deﬁned by the cutoﬀs aU
X >a U
IX >a U
I .F i r m s w i t h a above aU
X do not
serve the European markets; ﬁrms with a between aU
X and aU
IX export from the U.S.
to Europe; and ﬁrms with a between aU
IX and aU
I invest in one European country and
export from that country to the other European countries; ﬁnally, ﬁrms with a<a U
I
invest in dedicated facilities in every European country (similarly to the unique FDI
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. (A3)
There are obvious restrictions which ensure that aU
X >a U
IX >a U
I . We assume that they
are satisﬁed.













1+( M − 1)τ1−ε − M (τU)
1−ε (A4)













1 − τ1−ε. (A5)
The assumption of equal market demands across all M countries entails a symmetric
equilibrium outcome in which the distribution of aﬃliates in each of the M countries
is identical. This will be satisﬁed if the U.S. ﬁrms who only have one foreign aﬃliate
(with costs between aU
I and aU
IX) choose the location of this aﬃliate among the M
identical countries at random. Given this feature, the number of U.S. ﬁrms exporting
to any one of the M countries relative to the number of U.S. ﬁrm with aﬃliates located















Similarly, the market share of U.S. exporters to a European country i relative to the






















I depend on the cutoﬀs only through the ratios
described in (A4) and (A5). We can therefore substitute (A4) and (A5) into these




I as functions of the model’s parameters, as we
did in the main text. It then follows that, more dispersion in ﬁrm productivity levels –
as measured by the shape parameter of the Pareto distribution – reduces in country i
the number and market share of ﬁrms that export from the U.S. to country i relative
to the number and market share of aﬃliates of U.S. multinationals that are located in
country i. (A4), (A5), and (A6) also imply that increases in trade costs τU – holding
either τ or τ/τU ﬁxed – will also lead to a decrease in the relative number and market
share of U.S. exporters (versus FDI). Note that in the deﬁnition of the sales in country
i of aﬃliates of U.S. multinationals we do not include exports from aﬃliates located in
other European countries.
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Figure 1: Proﬁts from domestic sales, from exports and from FDI
a 1
D a 1 X a 1 I a 1 0
a 1   of density  y  probabilit
Figure 2: Probability density of labor productivity






















































































































































































































































































































































Figure 4: Regression Fit to the Pareto Distribution
37Table 1: BEA 3-Digit Manufacturing Sectors
201 Meat Products 329 Stone, Minerals, and Ceramics
202 Dairy Products 331 Ferrous metals
203 Vegetables and Preserves 335 Non-Ferrous metals
204 Grain Mill Products 341 Metal Cans, Fabricated Metal
205 Bakery Products 342 Cutlery
208 Beverages 343 Heating and Plumbing Equipment
209 Other Food 349 Metal Services
210 Tobacco 351 Engines and Turbines
220 Textiles 352 Farm Machinery
230 Apparel 353 Construction Machinery
240 Wood and Lumber 354 Metalworking Machinery
250 Furniture 355 Special Industrial Machinery
262 Pulp and Paper 356 General Industrial Machinery
265 Processed Paper 357 Computers
271 Newsprint 358 Refrigeration Equipment
272 Other publishing 359 Other Industrial Equipment
275 Commercial Printing 363 Household Appliances
2 8 1 I n d u s t r i a lC h e m i c a l s 3 6 6 A u d i o ,V i d e o ,C o m m u n i c a t i o n sE q u i p m e n t
283 Drugs 367 Electronic Components
284 Soap and Cleansing Products 369 Other Electronics
287 Agricultural Chemicals 371 Motor Vehicles
289 Other Industrial Chemicals 379 Other Transport Equipment
305 Rubber 381 Scientiﬁc and Measuring Equipment
308 Miscellaneous Plastics 384 Medical Equipment
310 Leather 386 Optical and Photographic Equipment
321 Glass 390 Miscellaneous Manufacturers





















* Indicates Narrow Sample
Table 3: Correlation Between Alternative Measures of Dispersion
U.S. Europe France Europe France
Std. Std. Std. Reg. Reg.
Dev. Dev. Dev. Coef Coef FP RD KL
U.S. S.D. 1
Europe S.D. 0.507 1
France S.D. 0.567 0.895 1
Europe Reg. 0.526 0.959 0.919 1
France Reg. 0.541 0.973 0.905 0.984 1
FP 0.455 0.621 0.508 0.652 0.624 1
RD 0.134 0.445 0.354 0.438 0.475 0.498 1
KL 0.129 0.585 0.500 0.507 0.523 0.515 0.365 1
39Table 4: Exports versus FDI - Baseline Results
Narrow Sample (N=962)
U.S. Europe France Europe France
Std. Dev. Std. Dev. Std. Dev. Reg. Coeﬀ.R e g . C o e ﬀ.
FREIGHT -1.241 -1.146 -1.193 -1.173 -1.176
(-9.018) (-8.489) (-9.049) (-8.582) (-8.609)
TARIFF -0.354 -0.512 -0.410 -0.555 -0.542
(-2.506) (-3.732) (-3.203) (-3.901) (-3.855)
FP 0.580 0.794 0.767 0.731 0.702
(6.011) (6.747) (7.006) (5.845) (5.675)
DISPERSE -2.052 -2.727 -2.396 -1.935 -1.899
(-6.903) (-7.024) (-8.273) (-5.667) (-5.545)
R2 0.318 0.327 0.352 0.309 0.310
Wide Sample (N=1176)
U.S. Europe France Europe France
Std. Dev. Std. Dev. Std. Dev. Reg. Coeﬀ.R e g . C o e ﬀ.
FREIGHT -1.184 -1.094 -1.107 -1.114 -1.115
(-9.545) (-8.950) (-9.411) (-8.981) (-8.979)
TARIFF -0.241 -0.398 -0.311 -0.434 -0.424
(-1.851) (-3.106) (-2.570) (-3.297) (-3.234)
FP 0.579 0.734 0.727 0.669 0.630
(6.421) (6.662) (6.975) (5.773) (5.491)
DISPERSE -1.968 -2.370 -2.123 -1.667 -1.574
(-7.267) (-6.587) (-7.408) (-5.259) (-4.978)
R2 0.293 0.294 0.316 0.279 0.278
T-statistics in parentheses (calculated on the basis of White standard errors).
Constant and country dummies are suppressed.
40Table 5: “Beta” Coeﬃcients
Standard “Beta”
Mean Deviation Coeﬃcient
Dependent Var. -0.595 2.375
FREIGHT 1.863 0.653 -0.328
TARIFF 2.015 1.020 -0.204
FP 3.321 0.785 0.236
U.S. S.D. 1.749 0.316 -0.273
Europe S.D. 1.198 0.276 -0.317
France S.D. 1.224 0.375 -0.378
Europe Reg. 1.260 0.333 -0.271
France Reg. 1.257 0.336 -0.269
41Table 6: Exports Versus FDI - Controls
Narrow Sample (N=961)
U.S. Europe France Europe France
Std. Dev. Std. Dev. Std. Dev. Reg. Coeﬀ.R e g . C o e ﬀ.
FREIGHT -1.040 -0.959 -1.019 -0.935 -0.944
(-7.392) (-6.749) (-7.328) (-6.526) (-6.594)
TARIFF -0.365 -0.512 -0.421 -0.545 -0.539
(-2.644) (-3.636) (-3.917) (-3.781) (-3.775)
FP 1.177 0.932 0.927 0.947 0.934
(10.159) (7.827) (8.059) (7.453) (7.450)
DISPERSE -2.343 -2.153 -2.061 -1.503 -1.491
(-8.374) (-5.250) (-6.664) (-4.535) (-4.470)
KL -0.868 -0.495 -0.456 -0.628 -0.626
(-7.790) (-4.529) (-4.256) (-5.876) (-5.859)
RD -0.104 0.007 0.007 0.006 -0.002
(-2.197) (0.150) (0.144) (0.125) (-0.047)
R2 0.373 0.340 0.364 0.332 0.334
Wide Sample (N=1175)
U.S. Europe France Europe France
Std. Dev. Std. Dev. Std. Dev. Reg. Coeﬀ.R e g . C o e ﬀ.
FREIGHT -1.011 -0.935 -0.960 -0.915 -0.919
(-7.968) (-7.246) (-7.714) (-7.040) (-7.053)
TARIFF -0.241 -0.384 -0.306 -0.411 -0.407
(-1.876) (-2.964) (-2.457) (-3.073) (-3.057)
FP 1.133 0.861 0.868 0.867 0.848
(10.428) (7.719) (7.994) (7.318) (7.243)
DISPERSE -2.248 -1.866 -1.833 -1.284 -1.215
(-8.611) (-4.919) (-5.982) (-4.132) (-3.924)
KL -0.793 -0.454 -0.412 -0.569 -0.576
(-7.483) (-4.347) (-3.982) (-5.574) (-5.636)
RD -0.086 0.017 0.021 0.015 0.007
(-1.914) (0.367) (0.446) (0.326) (0.153)
R2 0.338 0.305 0.325 0.298 0.298
T-statistics in parentheses (calculated on the basis of White standard errors).
Constant and country dummies are suppressed.
42Table 7: Exports versus FDI - Random Eﬀects
(With Controls)
Narrow Sample (N=961)
U.S. Europe France Europe France
Std. Dev. Std. Dev. Std. Dev. Reg. Coeﬀ.R e g . C o e ﬀ.
FREIGHT -0.430 -0.398 -0.428 -0.397 -0.397
(-2.554) (-2.344) (-2.533) (-2.336) (-2.334)
TARIFF -0.113 -0.127 -0.105 -0.136 -0.133
(-0.922) (-1.033) (-0.857) (-1.107) (-1.085)
FP 1.376 1.132 1.096 1.154 1.137
(5.145) (4.128) (4.233) (4.107) (4.093)
DISPERSE -2.623 -2.763 -2.445 -2.031 -1.991
(-4.897) (-3.459) (-4.761) (-3.098) (-3.180)
KL -1.106 -0.613 -0.570 -0.757 -0.758
(-4.652) (-2.238) (-2.168) (-2.891) (-2.896)
RD -0.002 0.126 0.116 0.133 0.119
(-0.020) (1.029) (0.970) (1.081) (0.972)
R2 0.352 0.316 0.342 0.307 0.308
Wide Sample (N=1175)
U.S. Europe France Europe France
Std. Dev. Std. Dev. Std. Dev. Reg. Coeﬀ.R e g . C o e ﬀ.
FREIGHT -0.331 -0.322 -0.328 -0.320 -0.320
(-2.296) (-2.230) (-2.278) (-2.215) (-2.215)
TARIFF -0.004 -0.018 -0.004 -0.022 -0.021
(-0.038) (-0.155) (-0.035) (-0.193) (-0.187)
FP 1.361 1.110 1.081 1.127 1.103
(4.123) (3.455) (3.475) (3.377) (3.369)
DISPERSE -2.518 -2.559 -2.265 -1.864 -1.786
(-3.824) (-2.733) (-3.706) (-2.398) (-2.424)
KL -1.069 -0.599 -0.561 -0.734 -0.739
(-3.660) (-1.871) (-1.789) (-2.373) (-2.408)
RD 0.006 0.123 0.116 0.129 0.115
(0.042) (0.862) (0.811) (0.894) (0.805)
R2 0.312 0.274 0.297 0.267 0.267
Z-statistics in parentheses. Constant and country dummies are suppressed.
43Table 8: Exports versus FDI - Aggregated Europe
(With Controls and Random Eﬀects)
Wide Sample (N=680)
U.S. Europe France Europe France
Std. Dev. Std. Dev. Std. Dev. Reg. Coeﬀ.R e g . C o e ﬀ.
FREIGHT -0.493 -0.485 -0.487 -0.485 -0.483
(-2.882) (-2.810) (-2.837) (-2.806) (-2.795)
TARIFF -0.005 -0.044 -0.032 -0.058 -0.052
(-0.030) (-0.254) (-0.183) (-0.335) (-0.299)
FP 1.216 0.926 0.922 0.929 0.928
(4.683) (3.713) (3.874) (3.620) (3.663)
DISPERSE -2.242 -1.845 -1.748 -1.301 -1.322
(-4.351) (-2.595) (-3.765) (-2.217) (-2.371)
KL -0.989 -0.636 -0.588 -0.740 -0.737
(-4.339) (-2.560) (-2.447) (-3.105) (-3.102)
RD -0.023 0.076 0.073 0.078 0.071
(-0.208) (0.692) (0.671) (0.706) (0.648)
R2 0.314 0.273 0.289 0.268 0.270
Z-statistics in parentheses. Constant and country dummies are suppressed.
44Table 9: Exports versus FDI - Additional Robustness Results
(Clustered Standard Errors and IV speciﬁcations)
OLS IV
Narrow Wide Agg. Narrow Wide Agg.
Sample Sample Europe Sample Sample Europe
FREIGHT -1.040 -1.011 -1.001 -1.218 -1.118 -1.053
(-3.997) (-4.437) (-4.464) (-3.862) (-4.366) (-4.545)
TARIFF -0.365 -0.241 -0.077 -0.188 -0.124 -0.016
(-1.611) (-1.081) (-0.304) (-0.706) (-0.478) (-0.056)
FP 1.177 1.133 1.086 1.609 1.457 1.344
(4.876) (4.472) (4.166) (3.605) (3.311) (3.182)
DISPERSE (US) -2.343 -2.248 -2.150 -4.321 -3.681 -3.198
(-3.689) (-3.655) (-3.349) (-2.606) (-2.248) (-2.217)
KL -0.868 -0.793 -0.848 -0.938 -0.848 -0.890
(-3.032) (-2.513) (-2.593) (-2.855) (-2.496) (-2.599)
RD -0.104 -0.086 -0.087 -0.158 -0.127 -0.121
(-0.851) (-0.687) (-0.691) (-1.233) (-0.985) (-0.968)
R2 0.373 0.338 0.314 0.328 0.315 0.315
N 961 1175 678 961 1175 678
In the IV speciﬁcations, the US dispersion measure is instrumented using all four
European dispersion measures.
All T-statistics (in parentheses) are computed from standard errors that are
heteroskedasticity consistent and adjusted for clustering by industry.
Constant and country dummies are suppressed.
45Table A1: Dispersion Measures
Standard Deviation Reg. Coef. Standard Deviation Reg. Coef.
Sector U.S. Eur. Fra. Eur. Fra. Sector U.S. Eur. Fra. Eur. Fra.
201 2.15 1.16 1.13 1.18 1.19 329 1.48 0.90 0.89 0.94 0.95
202 1.82 1.43 1.49 1.47 1.45 331 1.88 1.52 1.45 1.56 1.58
203 2.03 1.12 1.17 1.14 1.12 335 1.49 1.34 1.20 1.40 1.38
204 1.36 1.17 1.19 1.19 1.20 341 1.92 1.05 1.21 1.09 1.06
205 1.96 1.11 1.06 1.15 1.18 342 1.71 0.86 0.81 0.88 0.90
208 1.94 1.29 1.33 1.32 1.32 343 1.84 1.09 1.27 1.16 1.14
209 1.69 1.16 1.12 1.19 1.21 349 1.62 1.03 0.92 1.05 1.03
210 2.55 2.00 2.97 2.24 2.33 351 2.56 1.08 1.05 1.12 1.11
220 1.84 0.96 0.99 0.97 0.96 352 1.81 1.20 1.07 1.28 1.30
230 1.57 0.89 0.91 0.89 0.90 353 1.67 1.11 1.07 1.12 1.11
240 1.53 0.90 0.81 0.91 0.92 354 1.40 1.11 1.04 1.13 1.14
250 1.72 0.89 0.94 0.90 0.89 355 1.61 1.08 0.99 1.09 1.09
262 1.25 1.19 1.07 1.27 1.27 356 1.66 1.05 1.15 1.06 1.08
265 1.30 0.86 1.05 0.88 0.85 357 2.00 1.64 1.46 1.69 1.73
271 1.66 1.22 1.26 1.28 1.28 358 1.85 1.04 0.99 1.05 1.05
272 1.42 1.19 1.00 1.22 1.29 359 1.32 1.06 1.11 1.09 1.07
275 1.34 0.55 0.52 0.55 0.54 363 2.45 1.55 1.55 1.62 1.65
281 1.31 1.32 1.45 1.38 1.33 366 2.02 1.59 1.60 1.65 1.66
283 2.11 1.62 1.55 1.68 1.77 367 1.91 1.18 1.27 1.22 1.20
284 1.87 1.41 1.45 1.45 1.43 369 1.91 1.49 1.54 1.65 1.83
287 1.64 1.59 1.58 1.66 1.65 371 2.16 1.71 1.78 1.74 1.76
289 1.40 1.43 1.47 1.48 1.43 379 1.70 1.39 1.45 1.65 1.57
305 1.62 0.73 0.71 0.75 0.75 381 2.33 1.50 1.88 2.16 2.00
308 1.56 0.99 0.99 1.01 1.01 384 1.74 1.17 1.11 1.21 1.22
310 1.73 0.84 0.88 0.84 0.85 386 1.79 1.34 1.75 1.66 1.37
321 1.24 1.25 0.96 1.30 1.30 390 1.50 0.97 0.97 0.98 0.99
46